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FREEZING OF LABOR IN WARTIME
Regardless of the institutional or political structure of the coun-
tries engaged in modem warfare, competition for manpower among
the armed forces, agriculture and industries creates labor shortage prob-
lems which, of necessity, must be solved by similar methods as long
as the total amount of human resources is limited. A cursory glance
at the wartime labor legislation of Great Britain, Canada, the U.S.S.R.,
and Germany shows that the means of coping with the steadily increas-
ing labor shortage are on the whole similar in all four countries. Recent
developments in the field of manpower allocation1 and wage freezing in
the United States, while they have not nearly reached the extent of the
European countries, presage the introduction of labor control measures
the character of which can be best envisaged by reviewing the principal
features of major legislative enactments designed to overcome increas-
ing labor scarcity during the past three and one-half years in these four
countries. 2
2 E.g., the subordination of the Selective Service System to the War
Manpower Commission. (Ex. 0. No. 9279, Dec. 5, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 10177.)
2For a discussion of underlying policies and administration of such
legislation, see Kiehel, Labor Scarcity and Labor-Market Policy Under an
Armament Program in Germany and Great Britain (1942) 5 SocmL SE-
cunn BuLrTwm, No. 9, 4; Schoenfeld and Whitney, Wartime Methods of
Dealing with Labor in Great Britain and- the Dominions (1942) 9 LAW
Am CorNTv. PRos. 522; Newmann, Labor Mobilization in the Nationalist
Socialist New Order, ibid, 544.
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GREAT BRITAIN3
Aside from several preparatory mobilization measures taken during
the period from September, 1939 to May, 1940, the labor supply and
allocation problem of the United Kingdom during its first war year
remained practically untouched. No restrictions were placed upon a
worker's freedom to leave his employment at will or upon the power
of an employer to dismiss a worker. The government continued to rely
on indirect methods of compulsion as theretofore, such as denial of un-
employment benefits to unemployed workers who refused to accept
suitable employment of national importance, the application of a
work-or-fight policy, production restrictions in nonessential industries
and inspection of plants by government officials for the purpose of
ascertaining and transferring workers whose skills were not adequately
or fully used. Only rarely and as a last resort were workers "directed"
to essential employment.
It was not enough merely to facilitate the transfer of labor to war
industries. Some measure was needed to prevent them from drifting
back to the labor exchanges for new assignments. With the issuance
of the Essential Work (General Provisions) Order in March, 1941,'
the way to organized labor transference was cleared. The Essential
Work Order instituted a direct control over dismissals and voluntary
departures from employment. It constituted a means of checking
turnover by forbidding both workmen and employers in essential war
industries to rescind employment contracts without official permission.
Employers may not bid against each other for employees, and sky-
rocketing of wages is avoided. Application of the order to an industry
is not automatic. It depends upon scheduling by the Minister of Labor
of any enterprise which is engaged in "essential work" as defined in
the order. Under an amendment specific classes or descriptions of per-
sons may be scheduled instead of the entire enterprise. In a scheduled
establishment employment is guaranteed under terms no less favor-
able than are fixed for the same kind of work by collective agreement.
The management may discharge employees only for serious miscon-
duct, and the employee's right to leave is strictly controlled and is, in
general, subject to permission from a national service officer and at
least one week's notice. Unexcused absence is penalized. In return the
employee receives a guaranteed time-rate minimum wage.
Having thus assured that a transferred worker will remain on his
new job, transference from one job to another, and whenever needed,
from one locality or region to another, became a frequently used de-
vice of labor allocation and distribution. Rules and orders subsequently
issued merely adjusted existing legislation to the daily changing needs
of war production.
Cooper, Labor Mobilization Legislation in Great Britain, U.S.S.R.,
and Germany, 11 GEO. WASH. L. Rsv. 213-226 (Feb., 1943).
4 Essential Work (General Provisions) Order, S. R. & 0. 1941, No. 1051,
dated July 18, 1941, and superseded by S. R. & 0. 1942, No. 371, dated
March 2, 1942, and S. R. & 0. 1942, No. 583, dated March 25, 1942, S. R. & 0.
1942, No. 687, dated April 11, 1942, S. R. & 0. 1942, No. 1413, dated July
16, 1942, and revoked by S. R. & 0. 1942, No. 1594, dated Aug. 6, 1942. The
Order provided also for the swift prosecution of workers failing to carry
out conscientiously their assignments through absenteeism or persistent
lateness for work without reasonable excuse.
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On December 18, 1941, the National Service (No. 2) Act, 19411
was enacted. It placed on all citizens, 18 to 55 years of age, a general
obligation to serve in either a military or civilian capacity. Pursuant
to its provisions, all men up to the age of 51, not on active military
duty, were placed in some branch of the civilian services, whereas all
single women, between the ages of 20 to 30 inclusive, liable to con-
scription either for the armed forces, for civilian defense, or for some
branch of the civilian services, not engaged as yet in essential work
of the above type, were directed to vital industrial work.
Thus was legislation, necessary to effectuate labor mobilization in
conformity with the need to increase war production in the face of
progressively exhausted labor reserves, put into practice. At present,
compulsory service includes the obligation to stay on an assigned job or
be transferred to any enterprise officially designated as essential to the
war effort or necessary for maintaining supplies or services essential to
the life of the community.* It can be imposed upon any bona fide resi-
dent of the United Kingdom, and such service includes the obligation
of conscientious performance of assigned tasks. Continued absenteeism
or lateness without reasonable justification renders a worker liable to
standard penalties under the Defense Regulations. Penalties include
imprisonment from tywo to three years or fines from one hundred to
five hundreds pounds or both.
Effective May 8, 1943, was a new Order by the Minister of Labour
entitled the Control of Employme'nt (Directed Persons) Order, which
Order, the British Information Services says, has two objects:
"(1) Hitherto, only rarely have workers been "directed" into
work which does not come under the Essential Work Order. It
is now necessary to extend this, and therefore also to safe-
guard the conditions, including the wages, of the workers so
directed, just as they would be under the Essential Work
Order. Therefore, for the period during which a direction re-
mains in force, the employer may not discharge the worker
except for serious misconduct, and the worker may not leave
the employment, though either the worker or the employer
may apply to the National Service Officer for the direction to
be withdrawn so that the employment may be terminated.
In cases of alleged serious misconduct, an appeal is possible
to a local Appeal Board which will make a recommendation
to the National Service Officer. The normal period of direc-
tion will be for six months, but in cases of urgency it may be
for a shorter period. There are now about 8,000,000 workers,
excluding the Merchant Navy, under the Essential Work
Orders, and the new Order is necessary for supplying substi-
tutes for these workers in unscheduled work who are needed
elsewhere for work of the highest importance.
"(2) Hitherto, part-time work, even in a plant covered by
the Essential Work Order for its full-time workers, has not
been covered by that Order; nor, hitherto, has there been any
power for directing people compulsorily into part-time work.
At present, there are about 600,000 part-time workers, virtu-
55 and 6 GEO. VI, c. 4 (1941).
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ally all women, and so far only persuasion has been used. Part-
time work is work up to 30 hours a week and the present stage
of the war and the need for ensuring the usage of all labour
to the fullest advantage necessitates the taking of such com-
pulsory powers, though it is not intended to use them whole-
sale but only when necessary. Wages and conditions must
equal the standard required u n d e r the Essential Work
Orders.. ."
While it will thus be seen that Great Britain has gone a long way
toward "labor freezing," a positive national wage policy has not been
adopted.6 Concern was expressed by the Government in 1941 lest the
steady upward trend of wages contribute toward inflation, now that
civilian goods are restricted in quantity. It sought the adoption of a
plan that would permit wage rises in meritorious cases where in-
equities exist but would stop general increases. In answer the Trades
Union Congress held that some inflation is inevitable in wartime and
that any serious attempt to solve the problem should begin by curtail-
ing working time, thus increasing productivity and benefiting the
health and well-being of labor while lowering workers' incomes by re-
ducing the volume of work at overtime pay. At the same time further
price controls, rationing, control of profits, and lending of savings to
the Government were advocated. As a matter of fact, when the ill
effects of overtime became pronounced, that is, in lowered productivity
and increased absenteeism and illness, the Minister of Labour pro-
posed a scheme for gradual reduction in working time under a system
of rotation to a maximum of 55 or 56 hours weekly. As the hours of
men, except in specially hazardous occupations, are not limited by
law, working time continues to be fixed by agreement of employers and
workers. Money wages are higher in Great Britain than at any previous
time.
CANADA
In Canada, a wage policy was formulated by order in council ot
December 16, 1940, to guide the various Canadian conciliation boards
in establishing cost-of-living bonuses. An order of wider scope was
issued on October 24, 1941, designed to supplement the Government's
anti-inflation policy without imposing undue hardship on wage earners.
It provided that basic wage rates were to be frozen at the level of
November 15, except that unduly low or high rates could be brought
into line with prevailing rates for the same or similar occupations. At
the same time all employers not specifically exempt were ordered to
pay a cost-of-living bonus on basic wage rates, calculated according
to changes in the official index of cost-of-living. The bonus may not
raise wages above prevailing levels and is subject to the employer's
ability to pay. August 1, 1939 was made the base period of 100 and
for every rise or fall of one point employers were required to adjust
the cost-of-living bonus.
The Order of the Canadian Privy Council promulgating "The Sta-
bilization of Employment in Agriculture Regulations, 1942," effec-
tive March 23, 1942, in effect constitutes a freezing measure. These
"Schoenfeld and Whitney, supra, n. 2.
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regulations seek to accomplish "freezing" indirectly by restraining
workers in agriculture on the effective date of the order from obtain-
ing employment elsewhere, and at the same time restraining prospec-
tive nonagricultural employers from hiring such a worker. The regu-
lations do not restrict the employer's right to discharge an agricultural
worker, nor the latter's right to quit a particular agricultural em-
ployer. A somewhat similar technique is followed in other orders of
the Canadian Privy Council which forbid the entry into employment
in specified nonessential activities (called "restricted occupation") of
certain male persons (Order of March 21, 1942) and requires employers
to release critical workers requested by the Minister of Labour to trans-
fer to essential work.
THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS
As in Great Britain, stepped-up armament production accompanied
by increasing labor shortages caused a considerable labor turnover
in Russia which threatened to obstruct the entire preparedness pro-
gram. Existing labor stabilization methods, such as work books,7
curtailment of social wages for job shoppers,8 etc., did not prevent job
quitting and outright job freezing seemed the only-remaining alterna-
tive. Hence, on June 26, 1940, workers were forbidden to leave their
jobs without express permission from their employer, such permission
to be granted in exceptional cases only (e.g., serious illness, entrance
of the employee into higher educational institutions, etc.). Workers
violating the decree and employers neglecting to report unauthorized
job quittings were punished severely. Discharge of workers for tru-
ancy, prescribed by previous legislation, was forbidden and severe
punishment instituted instead. Simultaneously, labor piracy was de-
dared to be a criminal offense.
When a year later the invading Germans forced the evacuation of
a great many vital war industries and farms to safer zones, a decree
of Dec. 26, 1941, was designed to keep labor on its job and to compel
workers to transfer along with evacuated industrial or agricultural un-
dertakings.9 Unauthorized job quitting of such enterprise was made
punishable as military desertion by court martial. Originally intended
as a specific compulsory transfer measure, circumstances and interpre-
tation by the military courts transformed this decree into a general
compulsory transfer decree which gradually supplanted the decrees of
June 26, 1940 and of October 19, 1940. The prohibition contained in
the decree against desertion of vital war enterprises was made ap-
plicable not only to evacuated factories and farms but to all vital
war industries generally, and compulsory transfer applied to any type
of worker without regard to his qualifications.
7 Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. No. 1320
of Dec. 20, 1938, concerning the introduction of labor books.8 Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., the
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)
and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of Dec. 28, 1938,
on measures regulating labor discipline, improving the practice of state
social insurance and combatting abuses in that sphere. See translation of
this decree in (1939) 18 SLAVONIc AND EAsT-EuRoPEAN REviEw, No. 51, 702
et seq.
9 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. concerning
the liability of workers and employees of enterprises of war industries for
arbitrarily quitting the enterprises. See PRAVADA, Dec. 27, 1941, 2.
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Compulsory labor service in the U.S.S.R. includes the obligation
of conscientious performance of assigned duties. Persons falling short
of work schedules through wilful absenteeism or lateness are criminal
offenders subject to trial and punishment by corrective labor at a
place of work for a period not exceeding six months with a simultan-
eous reduction of not more than 25 per cent of their wages. Penalized
workers persisting in truancy are remanded to prison for the remainder
of their unexpired corrective labor term. As an indirect means of
enforcement of labor discipline, managers of enterprises who fail
to take legal action against truants are prosecuted. Similarly, man-
agers, chief engineers, and technical personnel responsible for the
quality of production are liable to prison terms ranging from five to
eight years for releasing substandard products.10
GERmANY
Although labor control measures designed to prevent labor turnover
and to keep workers on their jobs were already in force prior to the
outbreak of the war,"1 additional b r o a d e r legislation controlling
changes of employment was unavoidable if the mobilization measures
were to be effective. To this end an order of September 1, 1939, the
day war broke out, issued by the Ministerial Council for the Defense
of the Reich prohibited the unilateral rescission of any employment
contract in any branch of the national economy without the consent
of the Official Employment Office (Arbeitsamt).1 The decree, as
amended on September 6, 1939, prohibited also the hiring of workers
and employees, except for agricultural and mining jobs, and domestic
service in households with children under 14 years of age, without the
permission of the employment authorities.-' Workers were from then
on practically frozen in their jobs, for any change of employment re-
quired, under the law, two permissions, one emanating from the em-
ployer, or, in the case of his refusal, from the Employment Office hav-
ing jurisdiction over him, and the other emanating from the employ-
ment authorities having jurisdiction over the prospective new employer.
These provisions were further strengthened by decrees of May 20,
1942,11 June 13, 1942,15 and July 20, 1942.10
Compulsory mobilization measures are rigidly enforced. Absentee-
ism, lateness on the job, disobedience toward plant managers, refusal
to carry out assigned tasks, and undisciplined behavior of any kind are
forbidden. Labor pirating and the offer or acceptance of higher wages
or better working conditions than those established in the trade or in-
dustry for similar work by workers of the same skill and sex are also
10 Decree of July 10, 1940, of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
U.S.S.R. concerning liability for output of incomplete products or produots
of inferior quality as well as for noncompliance with the obligation con-
cerning standards of industrial products.
"I Cooper, supra, n. 3.
12 Order concerning restrictions on change of employment, RGB1, Pt. I,
1685; RAB1, Pt. I, 416.
13 First administrative order to carry out the order concerning restric-
tions on change of employment RGB1, pt. I, 1690; RABI, pt. I, 417.
14 Order safeguarding workers for the war economy, RGB1, pt. I, 340.
1 Administrative order to carry out the order safeguarding workers
for the war economy, RGB1, pt. I, 393.
18 Order against breach of employment contracts and against labor
pirating as well as against demanding disproportionately high wages in
private economy, RABI, pt. I, 341.
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forbidden. All violations of labor mobilization orders are punished
by penalties consisting of imprisonment and/or fines.
RECENT DEVELOPMIENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
The development of a national wartime labor policy on the wage issue
in the United States has been comparatively slow.17 An acceptable
national wartime wage policy should have at least a threefold objec-
tive: (1) as a control measure to help hold down a runaway period of
inflation; (2) as a protective measure to help maintain labor's real
wage and standard of living; and (3) as an emergency measure to help
ease the post-war readjustment period.
The principal argument for including wages in an over-all price-
control program has stressed the importance of wages as a cost of pro-
duction-that if wages are uncontrolled, prices will have to advance
in order to cover the higher costs of production. This advance will lead
to demands for higher wages to cover increased living costs, which will
against send prices upward. The principal arguments against including
wages in some rather rigid price-freezing regulations have stressed the
fact that higher wages do not necessarily mean higher labor costs-
that increasing labor productivity may offset any tendency toward
higher unit labor costs and that the proportion of labor costs to total
costs is rather low in many industries. In addition, labor points to the
recent large profits that many war industries have been receiving. Two
recent studies tend to support the general proposition that higher wages
do not necessarily cause higher labor costs and higher prices."'
While there are certainly elements of truth in both of these argu-
ments, it has been staied" that both seem to overlook the much more
vital issue in the problem of wage-and-price control, namely, the con-
sideration of wages and profits as distributive shares influencing con-
sumer demand rather than as primarily a cost of production. The
strongest arguments for some wage-and-price control measures in the
war period centers around the necessity for limiting consumer demand.
Mr. McNatt concludes that it is therefore extremely doubtful how far
government price-fixing will be successful as an effective device for
controlling prices, wages, profits, and cost-of-living, unless it is coupled
with the strongest governmental measures for limiting consumer de-
mand.
Mr. McNatt further concludes that implications of wage-freezing
clearly extend such a program to one of freezing the worker in his job
and compulsory rationing of labor.
The first recent significant development toward a national wartime
wage policy was the establishment of the so-called "Little Steel For-
"
1See E. B. McNatt, Toward a National Wartime Labor Policy: The
Wage Issue, 51 JOURNAL OF PoLmcAI. EcoNoays 1 (Feb., 1943) for an excel-
lent discussion and analysis of the development of a national wartime
labor policy on wages through the old National Defense Mediation Board,
the present War Labor Board and the War Manpower Commission. The
article also discusses the cost-of-living yardstick set up in the Little Steel
Cases with an examination of the merits and limitations of a cost-of-
living guide to the wage policy. The limitations and deficiencies of such
a formula are said to be grave.
28 Isador Lubin, Wage Policies and Price Trends, 31 SuRvz= GRaPmc 19-
23 (1942); Labor Productivity and Labor Costs, 1939-41, 53 MoNTHLY LABOR
RzEviW, 1388-91 (1941).
19McNatt, supra, n. 17.
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mula." The 15 per cent rule had its genesis in the National War Labor
Board's decision in the famous Little Steel cases.2" Seeking to translate
into a concrete policy the wage portion of the President's stabilization
message of April 27, 1942, the Board determined that the period be-
tween January 1, 1941, and May 1, 1942, during which the cost of living
had advanced 15 per cent, would be used as the norm to determine
whether workers had maintained their peacetime standards. Workers
whose hourly rates had risen by 15 per cent since the base date would
be entitled to additional increases only if inequalities or substandards
were shown. The Board thus established three grounds for upward
adjustments in rates-(1) Cost of living increases within the 15 per
cent limit; (2) inequalities; and (3) sub-standards of living.
The Economic Stabilization Order issued on October 2, 1942, au-
thorized the Board to approve wage increases above the September
15th level only where necessary to correct maladjustments or inequal-
ities, to eliminate substandards of living, to correct gross inequities, or
to aid in the effective prosecution of the war. This was construed by the
Board as providing for a continuance of the Little Steel formula. Mal-
adjustments were interpreted as instances in which the 15 per cent ad-
justment had not been realized. Gross inequities were related to in-
equalities. Effective prosecution of the war was assimilated to adjust-
ments to influence or direct the flow of manpower.
As a practical matter, the correction of inequalities early became
the principal ground for obtaining adjustments. Most workers had al-
ready received their 15 per cent raise, while the Board announced as a
policy that it would not act alone to influence the flow of manpower.
The ground of substandards of living was infrequently used.
By the beginning of 1943, however, the cost of living had advanced
nearly 22 per cent above the January, 1941, level and labor groups in a
chorus demanded an upward revision of the 15 per cent rule. The de-
mands reached a climax in a proposal by the labor members of the
Board that the 15 per cent rule be scrapped in favor of a more "real-
istic" policy in line with the present cost of living. This was rejected,
but the Board faced a new crisis as a head-on collision between the
15 per cent rule and the wage demands of the bituminous coal miners
became imminent.
On April 8, 1943, President Roosevelt issued the sweeping Executive
Order Number 9328-the "hold-the-line" order which virtually froze
all wages and salaries within the confines of the 15 per cent Little
Steel rule. The President's following statement explaining the Order
clearly stated what he purported to do and shows that the wage
freeze was part of a broad plan to reinforce the national economy
against all inflationary forces:21
"The Executive Order I have signed today is a hold-the-
line order.
"To hold the line we cannot tolerate further increases in
prices affecting the cost-of-living or further increases in gen-
eral wage or salary rates except where clearly necessary to
substandard living conditions. The only way to hold the line
20 N.W.L.B. case Nos. 30, 31, 34, and 35.21 New York Times, April 9, 1943, p. 1.
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is to stop frying to find justifications for not holding it here or
not holding it there.
"No one straw may break a camel's back, but there is al-
ways a last straw. We cannot afford to take further chances
in relaxing the line. We already have taken too many.
"On the wage front the directions in the order are equally
clear and specific.
"There are to be no further increases in wage rates or
salaries' scales beyond the Little Steel formula, except where
clearly necessary to correct substandards of living. Reclassifi-
cations and promotions must not be permitted to affect the
general level of production costs or to justify price increases
or to forestall price reductions.
"The order also makes clear the authority of the chairman
of the War Manpower Commission to forbid the employment
by an employer of any new employee except in accordance
with regulations of the chairman, the purpose being to prevent
such employment at a higher wage or salary than that re-
ceived by the employee in his last employment unless the
change of employment will aid in the prosecution of the war."
Under the Order, grounds for increases in both wages and salaries
were narrowed to three-(1) to compensate for the 15 per cent rise
in the cost of living between January 1, 1941, and May 1, 1942; (2)
to correct substandards of living; and (3) to effect reasonable adjust-
ments with respect to promotions, reclassifications, merit increases, in-
centive wages or the like.
Eliminated as permissible bases for increases were the familiar terms
"gross inequities," "inequalities," and "to aid in the effective prosecu-
tion of the war." The War Labor Board, Coxmissioner of Internal
Revenue, and other agencies to which power to pass on adjustments in
wages and salaries had been delegated were directed to authorize no
further increases except for the three purposes specified.
Immediately after the order was issued, the War Labor Board sent
a telegram to all regional war labor boards directing them to approve
no further increases except those which clearly come within the 15
per cent limitation. They were advised, however, that decisions made
prior to 7:30 p. m., EWT, on April 8, when the order was made
public, could be validly issued. Its action was obviously a stop-gap
measure designed to charter a safe course of action by regional offi-
cials until the Board could revamp its stabilization policy. Particularly
needed were a definition of "substandards of living," the Board's pro-
nouncements on that point having been sketchy, and a clarification of
"reasonable" adjustments for promotions, reclassifications, merit in-
creases, and so forth.
The most far-reaching effect of the "wage freeze" was the elimina-
tion of inequalities as a basis for increases. This alone has involved
considerable tightening of control, since a substantial proportion of the
increases the War Labor Board had been authorizing had been to cor-
rect inequalities in rates within plants or between plants in the same
labor market area or industry.
I The order also, however, directed a prohibition of "job shopping" by
authorizing the War Manpower Commission to forbid the employment
1943]
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of a new employee or the acceptance of a job by an employee at a wage
or salary higher than that received by him in his last employment unless
the change would aid in the effective prosecution of the war. Employees
would thus be restricted in shopping for higher wages and employers
would be limited in inducing migration by promises of higher wages.2 2
While the President's Order went far toward freezing of wage rates,
it did not affirmatively require the granting of increases within the
confines of the Little Steel formula or to remove substandards of
living. By reason of this fact, it has been said23 that the Board may
be left a measure of discretion to take into account "inequalities," the
factor on the basis of which the widest deviations from the strict 15
per cent rule had previously been made. It is said that this discretion,
if exercised, would be used to deny increases otherwise permissible so
as to avoid creating inequalities; for example, the Board could with-
hold its approval of a wage increase up to 15 per cent over the base level
on the ground that rates were already higher than those paid for similar
work in the community and to increase them to the full extent permit-
ted by the 15 per cent rule would be to accentuate an undesirable in-
equality.
The first wage decision after the April 8 Order was utilized by the
War Labor Board to dispel any doubt concerning its intention to adhere
rigidly to the spirit, intent, and literal meaning of the Order, but the
War Labor Board also made it clear that it still considered the
American wage structure filled with inequalities and gross inequities,
correction of which would rest entirely with the Director of Economic
Stabilization.24
The views of the Board are set forth in an opinion by Public Mem-
ber Wayne L. Morse in a case involving the Universal Atlas Cement
Co., a subsidiary of the United States Steel Corp.25 The decision was
concurred in by all members of the Board, although the A. F. of L.
members, in a separate concurring opinion, pointed out that their
favorable vote was not based on acceptance of the principles enunciated
in the Executive Order but was predicated on the realization that the
strict language of the Order deprived the Board of the power to apply
the principle of inequalities under which a different result would have
been reached.
=2Wage Freeze Within 15 Per Cent Rule, 6 WI7HR 353; Job Changes and
Wages Under New Regime, 12 LRE 201.
23 6 WHR 358.
24 First Decision Under New Wage "Freeze," 6 WHR 369.
25 Universal Atlas Cement Co. (Universal, Pa.) and International Union
of Mine, and Smelter Workers, Case No. 2931-D, April 13, 1943, 12 LRR 266,
6 WHR 369. The case involved a request by a local of the International
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (C.I.O.) for a 5 -cent hourly
wage increase on ,the ground that a similar increase had been granted
to employees in two other units of the company. A Board referee, in a re-
port filed prior to April 8, recommended that the Board grant the in-
crease to correct an existing inequality, although, under the 15 per cent
rule, the employees would be entitled to an increase of only 1.8 cents an
hour. Pointing out that under the new order it may grant increases only
within the limits of the 15 per cent rule, except where substandards are
shown, the Board pared the increase down to 2 cents an hour, granting the
additional two-tenths of a cent as a bookkeeping expedient.
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In his opinion, Dean Morse explained the Board's action in confining
the wage adjustment within the 15 per cent rule by saying that many-
inequalities and gross inequities still exist in the American wage struc-
ture, but under the new Executive Order they cannot be corrected by
.the War Labor Board. "The Director of Economic Stabilization," Dean
Morse continued, "has authority to issue policy directives to correct
any manifest wage injustices which in fact interfere with the war effort.
It is to be understood that the Board will make available to the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Director its advice and suggestions whenever it
can be of assistance to him on general policy directives. The Board
proposes to do all in its power to carry out the aims and objectives
of the President's 'hold-the-line' order. It does not propose to be a
party to any attempt to give to the order an interpretation inconsistent
with the clear meaning of the language of the order. ..
The C.I.O. members likewise assailed the injustice of the,Order, but
suggested a positive approach to the problem through the powers vested
in the Stabilization Director to deal with inequalities.
In criticizing the policy under which it was necessary to deny the
full increase, the A. F. of L. members centered their attack on the in-
equities of an order freezing existing injustices. "It is most unfair and
contrary to the war effort," they stated, "to issue an order which effec-
tively discriminates against the equities accruing to workers in cases
pending before the Board. This order 'freezes' gross inequities and
manifest injustices; this principle is foreign to all concepts of American
justice."
Any hopes that the War Labor Board would give special treatment
to wage cases pending at the time Executive Order 9328 was an-
nounced, under the "time equities" theory advanced in the Little Steel
decision, were dispelled by supplemental instructions sent to members of
regional boards on April 13. Issuing its first instructions to the regional
boards since the Executive Order, the Board stated that its General
Orders No. 4 and 5 would not be affected by the Order. General Order
No. 5 exempts employers of less than eight employees from obtaining
approval for wage increases, while General Order No. 4 permits indi-
vidual adjustments without approval if the adjustments are incident to
the terms of an established wage rate schedule or wage agreement and
are made as a result of individual promotions, reclassifications, or merit
increases.26
In accordance with the April 8 Order, the War Manpower Commis-
sion issued regulations on April 16 to restrict the transfer of workers.2 7
The effect of the regulations is to make it more difficult to hire em-
ployees away from employers engaged in essential activities than it is
to hire employees away from employers engaged in nonessential ac-
tivities. This effect is operative in any area. It is accentuated, how-
ever, in areas where employment stabilization plans are in force.281
The regulations also remind both employers and employees of the
penalties which may be applied if employers hire in violation of regu-
lations or workers accept jobs contrary to the regulations. The maxi-
mum penalty consists of a fine of $1,000 and one year's imprisonment.
26 Time Equities Under April 8 Wage Order, 6 W-Ml 371,
2712 LRR 251.
28 See 10 LRR 826.
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Employers may also be penalized through taxation, wages or salaries
paid to employees hired in violation of the regulations being considered
non-deductible as expenses in income tax returns.
In all areas employees engaged in nonessential occupations may be
hired without restrictions imposed by the regulations. In those areas
where no employment stabilization plan is in effect, employees who,
within the previous 30 days, have been engaged in essential occupations
may be hired only at rates which are not in excess of what the em-
ployees most recently received.
In areas, however, where employment stabilization plans are in ef-
fect, an employer engaged in an essential activity may hire new em-
ployees without restriction on the amount offered, provided such hiring
is permitted under the stabilization program by the War Manpower
Commission. Permission is ordinarily given in the form of a statement
of availability. Conditions surrounding the issuance of such state-
ments or certificates were set forth as follows in the regulations:
"A statement of availability shall be issued to any worker
by his last employer or by the War Manpower Commission
as may be provided in such employment stabilization programs
and whenever the worker:
"(1) Is discharged by his last employer;
"(2) Is laid off for an indefinite period or for a period of
seven or more days; or
"(3) Can establish that his present employment does not
utilize him at his highest skill or that he is not being employed
at full time.
"No statement of availability shall be issued solely on the
ground that an individual's wage or salary rate is subse-
quently less than that prevailing in the locality for the same
or substantially similar work.
"Any such statement shall contain the worker's name, his
social security account number, if any, the name and address
of the issuing employer or War Manpower Commission officer
and office, the date of issuance, and a statement to the effect
that the worker may be hired elsewhere in essential activity.
The inclusion by an employer on such notice of any informa-
tion other than that required by this regulation shall be
deemed to be a violation of this regulation."
The regulations apply to the hiring of "new employees," a term which
is defined to mean persons who have not worked for the prospective
employer within the prior period of 30 days.29
It will be seen that the radical distinction made between job trans-
fers permissible in stabilized and non-stabilized areas has resulted in
employees doing essential work in unstabilized areas being practically
frozen in their jobs, while workers similarly engaged in essential jobs
in areas administered by stabilization plans were allowed to shift to a
higher-paying job if they could procure a certificate of availability.
Subsequently, the Manpower Director announced that certificates
of availability might be obtained at the United States Employment
Service offices in non-stabilized areas.30 This had the prospective effect
2 Restrictions on Right to Hire, 12 LER 251.
"oManpower Rules Under Test of Experience, 12 LRR 301.
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of bridging the gulf separating rigidities in job transfers prevailing
in non-stabilized areas from the greater adaptability possible in areas
where an employment stabilization plan is in effect.
Meanwhile the situation existing in non-stabilized areas as to new
employees and transfer of jobs is substantially as follows, as outlined
in statements made by the Manpower Director, Paul V. McNutt, and
his assistant, Fowler Harper: An employee engaged in an essential occu-
pation and who does not obtain a special certificate of availability may
not improve his situation by transferring to a new job except in one of
two ways. He may leave his job and after thirty days apply for the better
job or he may accept a new job at the same or lower pay and later be up-
graded. Employers are warned, however, that up-grading in such circum-
stances in an abnormally short time will be regarded as a subterfuge, ren-
dering both employer and employee liable to penalties. An employee
working in a non-essential industry may take a higher paid job in an
essential industry.8
The president of the A: F. of L. and C. I. 0. both expressed opposition
to the new regulations and announced their intention of seeking modifi-
cations.
3 2
Very recently a new condition was added to the procedure under the
above regulations. On May 17, it was announced by Col. Walter J.
DeLong, Washington State Director of Selective Service, following a
3' For a more complete exposition, see 12 LRR 301. Subsequent to the
War Manpower Regulations' issuance new regional manpower plans were
evolved, and there began an enlarged use of War Manpower Commission
Certificates. Of the new moves, one was taken in Region Eight (Minn.,
N. D., S. D., Ia., Neb.) where the manpower director laid down criteria
for the issuance of certificates of availability even though no stabilization
plan was in effect. The other was taken in Region Five (Ohio, Mich., Ky.)
where a new master stabilization plan was announced to which all local
plans in the region must conform and which sets up minimum standards
to which new plans must conform. The plan includes regulation of
hiring practices and migration as well as rules for issuance of certificates
of availability. For a further discussion of these two plans see, Enlarging
Use of WMC Certificates, 12 LRR 343. Still later two new regional employ-
ment stabilization plans covering a total of nine states were announced by
the War Manpower Commission. The new plans, covering Region VII
(Ala., Fla., Ga., Miss., S. C., and Tenn.) and Region III (Penn., Del., and
N. J.) like plans previously adopted above for Regions V and VIII forbids
transfers solely on the ground that the individual's wage rate is below the
prevailing standard. These new plans are discussed in New Regional Man-
power Plans, 12 LRR 380.3 William Green, president of the A.F.L., in a formal statement char-
acterized the regulations as "uncalled for and unnecessary at the moment"
and "an assault upon the exercise of freedom by working men and women
and of their right to sell their labor under the most advantageous condi-
tions and to exercise their rights under our free enterprise system."
Phillip Murray, president of the C.I.O., asked Mr. McNutt to rescind his
regulations and establish instead joint management-labor stabilization
agreements wherever needed. He declared:
"The impact on the morale and efficiency of the employees who are
thus compelled to remain at work at a sweated or substandard wage whicb]
can only benefit the employer in terms of inflated profits, will necessarily
be devastating."
Mr. Murray declared that the agreements should provide for adequate
health, safety, wage and working conditions; for transfer to jobs where
a higher skill may be utilized or weekly hours are sufficiently high; and,
for a guaranteed minimum weekly wage based on forty hours of work.
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conference with A. F. Hardy, area director of the War Manpower
Commission, that Selective Service Boards and the United States Em-
ployment Office will cooperate in handling transfers of draft age
men from one essential industry to another." Now certificates of avail-
ability will not be issued until approval by draft boards as well as the
federal employment service. This, says Col. DeLong, applies to all
workers who come under the selective service law.
Here is what happens when a registrant wants to change jobs: First
-he must obtain from his present employer permission to move to
another essential industry; then present this clearance to the U. S.
Employment Service. Second-If employment service finds the transfer
will benefit the war effort, it will forward the clearance and certifi-
cate of availability to the registrant's local draft board. Third-The
draft board will then determine whether the registrant is needed in his
present job, or whether he should be inducted into the armed forces.
After the wage "freeze" order was reinforced by Economic Stabilizer
Byrnes in a case where he took occasion virtually to close and lock
the door on future adjustments to correct interplant inequalities and
inequities, 4 the opposition to the rigidity of the Order became more
manifest than ever before. Public Member Wayne L. Morse of the
Board voiced his objections to an inflexible control of wages and
defended the wage policies of the War Labor Board prior to the April
8 Order. "It is very important," he said, "that we do not overlook the
fact that our economy is dynamic and cannot be successfully controlled
by economic strait-jackets." Dean Morse's plea for a more flexible
policy permitting cost of living adjustments and gross inequity correc-
tions is particularly interesting in view of the fact that he was equally
forceful in the Universal Atlas Cement Co. case in declaring that it
was the intention of the Board to adhere strictly to the letter of the
Order.
In the meantime, organized labor continued its protests against
the job and wage freeze aspects of Executive Order 9328. The first
such protest from a union official came from William Green, who, in a
public statement, served notice on the Administration that the A. F.
of L. would seek a modification of both the President's and Chair-
man McNutt's orders. He declared that "the right of an individual
to seek employment, to fight for and secure for himself decent wages,
to render service under the most advantageous and satisfactory condi-
tions is inherent and fundamental in the American way of life."
Concurrently, C. I. O.'s Cost of Living Committee termed the Presi-
dent's "hold-the-line" order a "hold-one-side-of-the-line order," which
was freezing wages and freezing workers into their jobs, but was doing
nothing about prices and the mounting cost of living.
As a result of these attacks, the War Labor Board then requested the
return of a part of its former power to grant wage increases for the
correction of inequalities, despite its previous declaration that it would
adhere rigidly to the spirit, intent, and literal meaning of the April
8 Order.3 5 In a statement sent tq Economic Stabilization Director
33 Seattle Star, May 18, 1943; Seattle Times, May 18, 1943.
"Reinforcement of Wage "Freeze" Order, 6 WER 389.
35See opinion of Wayne Morse in Universal Atlas Cement Co. case,
supra, p. 146.
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Byrnes who, under the new order,'has sole authority to approve in-
creases for the removal of inequalities, the Board outlined a new ap-
proach to the wage problem which would permit stabilization and equal-
ization. of wages, but on a regional basis. Under this proposal, if it
were found that the prevailing rate range for tool makers in a given
area were from $1.20 to $1.45 per hour for example, the Board would
have the power to raise to the $1.20 minimum any toolmaker now em-
ployed at a lower rate. It was not long before the Board's request and
proposal were heeded. On May 12, a new policy directive was issued
to supplement the April 8 order. The text of Director Byrnes' directive,
as released by Lloyd K. Garrison, executive director of the National
War Labor Board, is as follows:
"One. In order to provide clear-cut guides and definite
limits as a basis for correcting "substandards of living," and
as a basis for permitting the Board to make within the existing
price structure and within existing levels of production costs,
minimum and non-inflationary adjustments which are deemed
necessary to 'aid in the effective prosecution of the war or to
correct gross inequities' within the meaning of section 1 of the
Act of October 2, 1942, the Board is authorized to establish
as rapidly as possible, by occupational groups and labor mar-
ket areas, the wage-rate brackets embracing all those various
rates found to be sound and tested going rates. All the rates
within these brackets are to be regarded as stabilized rates,
not subject to change save as permitted by the Little Steel
formula. Except in rare and unusual cases in which the criti-
cal needs of war production require the setting of a wage at
some point above the minimum of the going wage bracket,
the minimum of the going rates within the brackets will be
the point beyond which the adjustments mentioned above may
not be made. The careful application of these wage-rate
brackets to concrete cases within the informed judgment of
the War Labor Board will strengthen and reinforce the stabil-
ization line to be held. Maladjustments between wages and
the cost of living will be considered by the board only for the
purpose of correcting substandard conditions of living, or de-
termining adjustments within the 15 per cent limit of the
Little Steel formula. In connection with the approval of wage
adjustments necessary to eliminate substandards of living or
to give effect to the Little Steel Formula or in connection
with the adoption of a longer work week, the Board may
approve wage or salary adjustments for workers in immedi-
ately interrelated job classifications to the extent required to
keep the minimum differentials between immediately interre-
lated job classifications necessary for the maintenance of pro-
ductive efficiency.
Two. All wage adjustments made by the Board which may
furnish the basis either to increase price ceilings or to resist
otherwise justifiable reductions in price ceilings, or if no price
ceilings are involved which may increase the production costs
above the level prevailing in comparable plants or establish-
ments, shall become effective only if also approved by the
Economic Stabilization Director. The Board shall cooperate
1943]
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with the Office of Price Administration or such other agency
as the Economic Stabilization Director may designate with a
view to supplying the Economic Stabilization Director with
the data necessary to judge the effect of any proposed wage
adjustment on price ceilings and the levels of production
costs."
The clarifying directive grants to the Board the authority it sought
in almost the identical language used in its request. The new directive
has been hailed as having put the War Labor Board back on a judicial
basis, permitting it to function again as a judicial body with flexible
authority. 8
As a result of the new directive, the Board again has authority to
approve wage adjustments for six purposes-(1) to correct malad-justments within the limits of the 15 per cent rule; (2) to correct sub-
standards of living; (3) to effect reasonable adjustments with respect
to promotions, reclassifications, merit increases, incentive wages or the
like; (4) to grant wage increases to correct gross inequities or to aid
in the prosecution of the war to the extent of raising wage rates up to
the "minimum of the going rate" for comparable work in comparable
plants or establishments in the same labor market; (5) in "rare and
unusual" cases, to set wage rates above the minimum going rate if the
Board determines that the critical needs of war production so require;
and (6) to grant increases necessary to remove intra-plant inequalities
which are created by either institution of a longer workweek or by the
Board's approval of wage increases to eliminate substandards or to
fulfill the requirements of the 15 per cent rule. In other words, where
earnings of some employees are increased, either by added overtime
or correcting substandards or applying the Little Steel formula, the
rates of other workers in the plant may be raised to the extent neces-
sary to restore the "minimum differentials between immediately inter-
related job classifications necessary for the maintenance of productive
efficiency. ' '13
The restored authority under the directive, Director Byrnes was
careful to point out, does not give the Board its former power to
correct "inequalities." Apart from the rare and unusual case, he added,
adjustments up to the minimum going rate are to be made, not to in-
crease existing wage schedules, "but only to bring obvious and sporadic
stragglers into line."
As required under previous orders, wage adjustments which furnish
a basis either for increasing price ceilings or for resisting otherwisejustifiable reductions in price ceilings become effective only on ap-
proval of the Stabilization Director. To this restriction the requirement
is added, however, that, even though no rise in the price ceiling is
involved, the Director's approval must be obtained if the wage increase
would increase production costs above the level of comparable plants.
Since the only ground added as a basis for granting wage increases
is the bringing of rates up to the "minimum going rate" for compar-
able occupational groups in the labor market, the awarding of industry-
wide wage adjustments or adjustments between industries is omitted
"o Seattle Times, May 13, 1943; Seattle Star, May 13, 1943.
87Partial Restoration of WLB's Wage Powers, 12 LRR 417; Area Yard-
sticks for Equalizing Wages, 6 WHR 441.
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from the Board's powers except as they may be permissible under the
15 per cent rule or to eliminate substandards.
There is under the new directive an obvious loophole-the authority
to adjust rates above the minimum of the "going wage bracket" in rare
and unusual cases in which the critical needs of war production require
it. How the Board construes this grant will determine just how broad
its new powers actually are. A limitation on any runaway exercise of
the authority exists in the requirement above mentioned that adjust-
ments affecting a price ceiling or raising the level of production costs
above that of comparable plants in the area require the approval of
the Stabilization Director.
Significant also is the impetus granted by the directive to the stabili-
zation of rates on a labor market basis. Already the criterion of sub-
standards of living is being defined by regional boards on a labor
market basis. With the provision for stabilization of all rates within
particular labor markets, the center of wage control is shifted almost
completely to the regional boards. The National Board may soon in
actuality be playing the role, frequently predicted, of a supreme court
in wage cases appealed to it from the regional boards.
Since the principal task of applying both the "substandards of living"
and "gross inequities" criteria for wage adjustments under the new
directive is thus centered in the regional boards, it is significant to
note that even before the May 12 directive the perplexing problem of
what constituted "substandards" had been tackled by several regional
War Labor Boards. The actions of the regional boards stemmed from
instructions first issued by the National Board at the time it an-
nounced its "shortened" procedure for handling wage cases and re-
peated and amplified after the April 8th Order was issued. In issuing
its "shortened" procedure, the National Board authorized the regional
officials to make determinations of substandards, with its approval, and
until such determinations were made to approve adjustments to elimi-
nate substandards up to fifty cents an hour for wages and twenty dol-
lars a week for salaries.38 In deciding wage disputes brought before
it, the Board had at that time refused to define subst .ndards in terms
of dollars or cents or to lay down any general rules, it being its policy
to decide each case on its individual merits. In carrying out the Na-
tional Board's instructions, several of the regional boards have indicated
that instead of establishing a single measure of substandards for the
entire region they will determine what rates are substandard "within
each area within the region. For example, reports from the Atlanta,
Detroit, and Denver Regional -Boards evidence progress toward the
definition of substandards on a regional or area -basis in a series of
cases.8 9 Meanwhile,"' the regional board at Philadelphia had asked
employers and labor organizations to submit written data on sub-
standard wages, and the regional boards at New York and Kansas
City had issued three decisions involving this question.4 h
'
8 See 5 WHR 275.
See for a discussion of this progress, Regional WLB Moves to Fix
Substandards, 6 WER 410.
4onWLB Decisions Under Executive Order 9328, 6 WBR 425.,
"% For further developments since the date of the writing of this paper
the reader is referred to Industry-Wide Effect for 15 Per Cent Rule, 6 WHR
481; WLB Instructions on 9338 Wage Increases, 6 WHR 483; Substandard
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THE CRIsIs-THE BiTuminous COAL SmnzxE
An interesting, although lamentable, development along with the
Government's wage freeze and manpower allocation program has been
the unfortunate bituminous coal miners' strike-the country's greatest
wartime strike crisis.
41
The bituminous coal operators and the United Mine Workers began
negotiations for a new contract to replace a contract expiring on March
31, 1943. On March 22, no progress having been made in the negotia-
tions, the President requested the parties to continue the production of
coal under the terms and conditions of the old contract until the dis-
pute was settled. The President's request resulted in an agreement by
the parties to extend the old contract until April 30. When the nego-
tiations were still deadlocked on April 22, however, the dispute was
certified to the War Labor Board.
42
On April 24, the Board ordered the parties to "continue the uninter-
rupted production of coal under the contract terms and conditions that
existed on and prior to March 31 until the differences that now separ-
ate the parties are peacefully and finally resolved, with the understand-
ing that if the new agreement includes any wage adjustments such ad-
justments shall be retroactive to March 31." When the United Mine
Workers refused to appear before the Board, the matter was submitted
to President Roosevelt. In its submission to the President, the Board
declared that the Mine Workers had refused to accept a procedure
for handling the dispute which they accepted in 1941, namely, continu-
ing production under terms of an expired contract, with any wage ad-
justments to be retroactive to the expiration date of the old contract.
The Board also pointed out that it was following its usual procedure in
refusing to consider the merits of a dispute while workers involved are
on strike.
"Under these circumstances," the Board declared, "the only possible
course for the Board to follow is the course which it consistently fol-
lows in cases where either the employees or the employer defies an
order of the Board, that is, refer the controversy to the President in
accordance with its established practice."
The demands of the miners, all of which had been rejected by the
operators, included demands for a general wage increase of $2.00 per
day, portal to portal pay, that it, pay from the time the miners report
at the entrance of the mine until they arrive back at that point, vacation
pay of $50.00 per year, furnishing by the operators of certain tools paid
for by the miners in the past, and extension of the bargaining units
to include certain supervisory employees.
The proposal advanced during negotiations by Secretary of Labor
Frances Perkins which may provide a basis for settlement of the wage
part of the dispute was that the operators "guarantee to the miners a
Ruling by WLB Under 9328, 6 WRR 484; Travel Time Issue in Coal Case,
6 WHR 489; Individual Raises Within Rate Schedules, 6 WHR 525; Equal
Pay for Women Under Order of WLB, 6 W-HR 526; WLB, No Pay for Non-
Working Time, 6 WHR 549; Regional Yardsticks for Substandards, 6 WHR
551; How WLB Will Operate Under 9328, 6 WBR 555; Area Yardstick for
Substandard Wages, 6 WHR 577; New Labels for Wage Raises Under 9328,
6 WHR 602; Outline of WLB Wage Policies, 6 WHR 606, (good summary
and review); Authority of WLB to Correct Inequities, 6 WHR 624; and
WLB's Role in Stabilizing Living, 6 WHR 627.
,"Meeting Greatest Wartime Strike Crisis, 12 LRR 341.
2 See 12 LRR 339.
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minimum of six days work per week." Extension of the customary
'workweek in the coal-mining industry from a five-day week of thirty-
five hours to a six-day week was provided by a recent agreement of
the parties, the Secretary pointed out, provision being made for time
and one-half pay for the sixth day's work. As a result of this action, the
Secretary had stated, the price ceiling on coal had been raised to com-
pensate the operators for the increased labor cost. Reports from the
mines indicated, however, that, although some mines were operating six
days per week, others were not. The Secretary's proposal had been
accepted by the union as a basis for further negotiation but was rejected
by the operators.
On April 29, President Roosevelt sent a telegram to John L. Lewis,
president of the union, and Thomas Kennedy, secretary-treasurer, mak-
ing an appeal to the miners to resume work immediately and, submit
their case to the National War Labor Board for final determination.
'3 The text of the President's telegram of April 29th to John L. Lewis
and Thomas Kennedy follows:
"The controversy between the United Mlline Workers of America and
the operators of the coal mines has been certified to the National War
Labor Board for settlement.
"The officials of the United Mine Workers were invited by the Board
to recommend a person for appointment to the panel charged with in-
vestigating the facts. They ignored the invitation. The Board then ap-
pointed Mr. David B. Robertson of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen to represent the employees, Mr. Walter White to represent
the operators, and Mr. Morris L. Cooke to represent the public.
"The personnel of this panel assures an impartial investigation of the
facts to be used by the Board in its determination of the controversy in ac-
cordance with the law.
"The officials of the United Mine Workers of America have ignored
the request of the Board that they present their case to ,the National
War Labor Board panel and likewise have ignored the request of the
Board that the strikers be urged to return to their work. I am advised
that many thousands of miners are out on strike and strikes are threat-
ened at many other mines which now are in operation.
"The procedure that has-been followed in this case by the Board is, I
am assured, in exact accord with that followed in all other controversies
of this character.
"In view of the statements made in telegrams to me from some mem-
bers of the United Mine Workers that OPA price regulations have been
disregarded and that the cost of living has gone up disproportionately in
mining areas, I have directed OPA to make an immediate investigation
of the facts and, wherever a violation of the law is disclosed by that in-
vestigation, to see that the violators of the law are prosecuted.
"The strikes and stoppages -in the coal industry that have- occured and
are threatened are in clear violation of the 'no strike' pledge.
"These are not mere strikes against employers of this industry to en-
force collective bargaining demands. They are strikes against the United
States Government itself.
"These strikes are a direct interference with the prosecution of the
war. They challenge the governmental machinery that has been set up
for the orderly and peaceful settlement of all labor disputes. They chal-
lenge the government to carry on the war.
"The continuance and spread of these strikes would have the same
effect on the course of the war as a crippling defeat in the field.
"The production of coal must continue. Without coal our war indus-
tries cannot produce tanks, guns, and ammunition for our armed forces.
Without these weapons our sailors on the high seas and our armies in
the field will be helpless against our enemies.
"I am sure that the men who work in the coal mines whose sons and
brothers are in the armed forces do not want to retard the war effort to
which they have contributed so loyally and in which they with all other
Americans have so much at stake.
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The President characterizes the strike as "against the United States
Government itself."1
4 3
The President's appeal was unavailing and on the further refusal by
John L. Lewis to appear before the Board or to change his position that
the miners would not work without a contract, President Roosevelt
ordered the mines taken over by Harold Ickes, Solid Fuel Adminis-
trator.4  This action was taken on May 1, at which time over 50,000
miners were on strike.
"Not as President-not as Commander-in-Chief-but as the friend of
the men who work in the coal mines, I appeal to them to resume work im-
mediately and submit their case to the National War Labor Board for
final determination."
41 Executive Order 9340, May 1, 1943-Federal Operation of Mines-is as
follows:
"Whereas widespread stoppages have occurred in the coal industry and
strikes are threatened which will obstruct the effective prosecution of the
war by curtailing vitally needed produotion in the coal mines directly
affecting the countless war industries and transportation systems depen-
dent upon such mines; and
"Whereas the officers of the United Mine Workers of America have
refused to submit to -the machinery established for the peaceful settlement
of labor disputes in violation of the agreement on the part of labor and in-
dustry that there shall be no strikes or lockouts for the duration of -the
war; and
"Whereas it has become necessary for the effective prosecution of the
war that the coal mines in which stoppages or strikes have occurred, or are
threatened, be taken over by the Government of the United States in order
to protect ,the interests of the nation at war and the rights of workers to
continue to work;
"Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States, as President of the United States
and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as
follows:
"The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to take im-
mediate possession, so far as may be necessary or desirable, of any and
all mines producing coal in which the strike or stoppage has occurred
or is threatened, together with any and all real and personal property,
franchises, rights, facilities, funds and other assets used in connection
with the operation of such mines, and to operate or arrange for the oper-
ation of such mines in such manner as he deems necessary for the success-
ful prosecution of the war, and to do all things necessary for or incidental
to the production, sale and distribution of coal.
"In carrying out this order, the Secretary of the Interior shall act
through or with the aid of such public or private instrumentalities or
persons as he may designate. He shall permit the management to con-
tinue its managerial functions to the maximum degree possible consistent
with the aims of this order.
"The Secretary of the Interior shall make employment available and
provide protection to all employees resuming work at such mines and to
all persons seeking employment so far as they may be needed; and upon
the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of War shall
take such action, if any, as he may deem necessary or desirable to provide
protection to all such persons and mines.
"The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to maintain
customary working conditions in the mines and customary procedure
for the adjustment of workers' grievances. He shall recognize the right
of the workers to continue their membership in any labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid or protection, provided that such concerted activities
do nothing to interfere with the operation of the mines.
"Possession and operation of any mine or mines hereunder shall be ter-
minated by the Secretary of the Interior as soon as he determines that
possession and operation hereunder are no longer required for the fur-
therance of the war program."
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The President, on May 2nd, appealed to the miners by radio to re-
turn to work the next day, when, he said, they would find the Stars
and Stripes floating over the mines. A few minutes before the broad-
cast, Mr. Ickes had been notified by Mr. Lewis that the union's execu-
tive board had declared a fifteen-day "truce," calling on the miners
to return to work on May 4th. Mr. Lewis reiterated his position that
the union was ready to meet the employer, who now was the Federal
Government, and negotiate an agreement.
Mr. Ickes, on May 3rd, acting as Solid Fuel Administrator, issued
an order requiring employers in absence of good cause, to operate-the
mines six days a week. He pointed out that this was not a guaranteed
six-day work week, such as Mr. Lewis had said would satisfy the miners'
demands, since the employers were not required to pay for the time if
it was not worked. Pursuant to the contract between the operators
and the union, which had been extended from April 1st, work on the
sixth day would be paid for at time and one-half, although the first
five days of work represented only thirty-five hours. In this respect the
overtime arrangement was more favorable for the employees than is
required under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Board hid previous-
ly given notice that its approval was not required for this move.
Mr. Ickes made it clear also that he was not negotiating with the
'union in settlement of the dispute, which remained with the War Labor
Board. The Board opened hearings on May 6th.
Meanwhile, the miners returned to work. A minority resumed work
on May 3rd, as requested by the President. The great majority re-
turned on May 4th, the date set by Mr. Lewis.
Hearings before a panel of the War Labor Board opened on May 6th,
but the union sent no representative in consonance with its position
that the matter should not be handled by the Board but should be
subject to direct negotiation.
The bituminous coal strike appears to be the showdown, since it
must be remembered that the War Labor Board's predecessor, the
National Defense Mediation Board, was destroyed by similar defiance
by the same union.45 And here, also, the chief point at issue in the
dispute, apart from the merits of the miners' demands, was the question
whether the controversy should be settled by the War Labor Board.
The Board is determined to force any resumptions of negotiations to
be arranged through it, and in this position both Byrnes and Ickes
agree. Mr. Lewis is equally adamant in his determination to by-pass
the Board and seems to be holding out for negotiations with Mr. Ickes
alone or with the mine operators acting as Ickes' agents.4 61
The final outcome of this action by the United Mine Workers has
not been settled at the writing of this paper,46 b but the fifteen-day
"truce" has been extended until May 31st. Let us hope that no further
action which would retard the war effort will be threatened.4 1C
45 See LRR Analysis, Dec. 15, 1941.
"4' Seattle Star, May 17, 1943; Seattle Times, May 17, 1943.
'
0b May 26, 1943.
16c Since the writing of this paper, on June 22, 1943, the "truce" was
extended to October 31st by the executive council of the union.
Between the dates of the writing of this paper and its publication, sev-
eral interesting current articles appeared in the Labor Relations Reporter,
namely, Coal Dispute Back to Parties, 12 LRR 490; President's Command
to Coal Strikers, 12 LRR 522; Fines for Strikers in the Coal Dispute, 12
LRR 553; and WLB Gives Verdict on Coal Dispute, 12 LRR 598.
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Various possible sanctions have been suggested to combat strikes
during the duration of the war, and in particular the mine workers'
strike. Since no element of employer defiance of the War Labor Board
enters the present picture, the relevant sanctions must be those which
can be used against strikers, striking unions, and union officials. Ob-
vious possibilities in this category, listed in inverse order of their strin-
gency, are:
4 7
(1) Use of troops to break up mass picketing and to protect strikers
desiring to return to work. This was used with immediate success in a
defense strike in the North American Aviation and General Cable
Company plants.
(2) Removal of draft deferments of strikers ("work or fight").
(3) Plant seizure, to make it literally true that the strike is against
the Government of the United States.
(4) Invocation-against strike leaders--of federal criminal code
provisions dealing with conspiracy and with attempting to defeat
"measure of the Government."
More potent than the obvious sanctions, however, are the possibili-
ties of new sanctions which may be developed out of the war powers
of the Government-which are so broad as to defy fixed limitation.
Highly suggestive along these lines are the words spoken not long ago
by the United States Supreme Court that the power "to declare war"
necessarily connotes "the plenary power to wage war with all the
force necessary to make it effective."48 Any necessary elements of such
"force" would clearly be available for the purpose stated by the Presi-
dent-"to prevent further interference with the successful prosecution
of the war."
Other possible alternative enforcement actions suggested as available
to the President under his present powers in the event of continued
refusal of striking employees to return to work after the taking over of
production facilities by the government would include the following: 49
(1) The President might order local draft boards immediately to re-
classify striking workers thus reverting to the "work or fight" tech-
nique invoked by President Wilson in World War I. This action, how-
ever, would appear to require a revision of present draft regulations, at
least insofar as the regulations make dependency rather than occupation
a basis for deferment, and would also appear to be limited to the extent
that recalcitrant workers are outside the draft age limits.
(2) As a further step, the President might, after induction of striking
workers in the armed forces, order them as members of the armed
forces to work at their former jobs.
(3) A third possibility is enactment of legislation such as the Austin-
Wadsworth War Service Act, which would provide criminal penalties
for the refusal of employees to perform assigned work.
The Austin-Wadsworth War Service Act was in reality a proposed
labor draft but was not premised on an over-all program for control
and allocation of production. The proposed act would require the regis-
tration of all men between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five and all
women between the ages of eighteen and fifty, and would authorize the
,7 Steps Available for Use in Showdown Over Forbidden Strike, 12
LRR Analysis, May 3, 1943.
11U. S. v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605.
,4 12 LRR 341.
[VOL. 18
COMMENTS
President, acting through the Selective Service System, to assign persons
to war work. According to a statement of its sponsors, the bill would
provide for the mobilization and designed direction of willing workers,
provide punishment for refusal to perform assigned duty only after
conviction in court, and would preserve reemployment, seniority rights,
and rates of pay to the same extent as men in the armed services have
such rights preserved. 0
The labor members of the Management Labor Policy Committee of
the War Manpower Commission voiced their opposition to the bill in
a statement which came as an answer to the endorsement given the
bill by the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson. They pointed out
that the question is not compulsion versus a voluntary program but
rather whether the production and manpower problems are to be ap-
proached on the basis of planned organization or by the exercise of
power without planning and understanding. The labor policy commit-
tee in stating its objections, endorsed instead the Tolan-Kilgore-Pepper
Bill, which would set up a central civilian control of manpower, pro-
duction, civilian economy and technological mobilization agencies.
"Meeting our manpower difficulties," the Committee declared,
"means the kind of planning which allocates contracts to the areas
where the labor supply problem can be met, the kind of planning which
makes sure that meeting the labor supply problem will not raise hous-
ing and transportation difficulties, the kind of planning which makes
sure that workers on the jobs in which they are now employed are
employed under conditions which utilize their highest possible skills,
the kind of planning which arranges for training programs to produce
the kinds of skills needed at the places where they are needed."'"
5oPlanning or Draft in Use of Manpower, 12 LRR 67.
51 In speaking of manpower difficulties, it is startling to find that esti-
mates on manpower requirements, prepared jointly by the Department
of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics and the War Manpower Commission's
Estimates and Statistical Coordination Division, reveal that despite increas-
ing labor shortage, the number of unemployed is not likely to fall below
a million by December, 1943. Increases in labor requirements are largely
concentrated in industrial centers where labor shortages already exist, but
most of the unemployed are in areas where there 'is no shortage of labor
or no shortage in their particular skills.
To meet shortages in critical occupations, it is estimated, 3.2 million
workers will have to be transferred from employment in less essential
activities. To overcome these shortages, the study points out, it will be
necessary to take ,the following steps:
(1) Utilize fully all workers now employed and eliminate labor
hoarding.
(2) Anticipate workers needed for employment increases and for re-
placements.
(3) Replace with youths, older men, or women, all men eighteen to
thirty-seven engaged in activities that can be performed by such workers.
(4) Eliminate the racial, and sex discrimination, that still exists.
(5) Transfer from labor shortage areas as much civilian and war
production as possible.
(6) Curtail, in labor shortage areas, all employment in activities other
than munitions industries to the bare minimum necessary to maintain
productive efficiency and civilian morale.
(7) Produce housing and community facilities in overcrowded shortage
areas for workers who can migrate from other areas.
19431
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
THE CONNALLY BILL5"
Legislation which grew out of the coal miners' strike is evidenced by
the Connally Plant Seizure Bill (S. B. 796) which passed the Senate
by a vote of sixty-three to sixteen and is still under consideration in
the House of Representatives at the time of the writing of this paper.
A great deal of influence is being exerted to prevent the passage of
the bill in the House.
5 3
The Connally Bill was passed in the Senate with the obvious purpose
of meeting the situation which might have arisen if the coal miners'
strike had been resumed on May 16 and which might still arise after
May 31st. As passed by the Senate and sent to the House, it provides
the following:
(1) Presidential seizure of any plant where there is an interruption of
operations as a result of a strike or other labor disturbance.
(2) Government operation under the same terms and conditions in
effect either at the time the government took possession or immediately
prior to the work stoppage which led to expropriation. However, either
the Government or the plant's employees or their representatives may
apply to the War Labor Board for a change in wages or other working
conditions in the plant, and the Board may handle the case under its
regular machinery.
(3) Prohibition against any attempt to interfere with production
in a plant taken over by the Government, either by (a) coercing, insti-
gation, or inducing any person to engage in a strike, slowdown, lock-
out, or other interruption; or (b) aiding in a strike, slowdown, or other
interruption by giving direction or guidance or by paying strike bene-
fits to the persons involved. Willful violation is subject to a fine up to
five thousand dollars, imprisonment up to a year, or both.
(4) Authority to the War Labor Board to issue subpoenas requiring
the attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence as may
be deemed material by the Board to its investigation of facts in any
labor dispute.
(5) Court review of decisions of the War Labor Board in relation
to matters of law.
(6) Provision for public hearings with the requirement that parties
be given full notice and opportunity to be heard. Failure of either
party to appear, however, would not deprive the Board of jurisdiction
to proceed to a hearing and order.
(7) War Labor Board would be given final authority to make ad-
ministrative interpretation of those provisions of the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942 (on such questions as wage increases) which re-
late to cases before the Board.
(8) Statutory authority and functions would be conferred upon
the War Labor Board-generally the same, however, as those it is pres-
ently performing under Executive Orders; and
(9) Specific statutory authority would be conferred upon the Board,
not only to decide disputes before it, but to "provide by order the wages
and hours and all other terms and conditions" of employment.
Dropped from the bill in its final form was a provision allowing
federal district courts power to enjoin violations or threatened viola-
tions of the measure, the effect of which would have been virtually to
52 Government Musters Forces in Coal Dispute, 12 LRR 377.
" See below for recent developments, n. 54.
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nullify the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act. The Senate also re-
jected the Taft amendment which would have set the War Labor Board
up as a statutory *agency and provided a cooling-off period during the
time a dispute was in the Board's hands. Two of the Taft Bill's chief
provisions, however, were written into the Connally Bill at the sugges-
tion of Senator Wagner. These provisions give the Board power to step
into a dispute on its own motion and to issue subpoenas to compel pro-
duction of records and attendance of witnesses.
Two other proposed amendments were turned down. One, by Senator
Langer, would have prohibited discrimination against any person on
the basis of race, color, or creed in plants taken over by the Govern-
ment. The other, by Senator Tydings, would have formally ratified
the President's seizure of the coal properties.
The Bill as passed would, as applied to the coal dispute, have the
effect, first, of making it a punishable offense to renew the strike
and, second, make it possible for the War Labor Board to compel the
attendance of representatives of the union.
This is the first time in contemporary history that the Senate of the
United States has passed an anti-strike bill. Born of the coal strike,
the Bill is, however, a war measure in its entirety, and the authority it
creates would expire six months aft6r termination of hostilities. Fur-
thermore, although it provides for criminal penalties, these could be
invoked only against strike leaders and only after the Government
had taken over operation of a war plant.
Some form of anti-strike legislation seems almost certain by reason
of the Senate's passage of the Connally Bill by such a large majority.
During the past several Congresses, the Senate or its committees have
blocked all general labor control legislation-from the Smith amend-
ments to the Wagner Act to the most recent measures to prevent strike
interruption in production for defense. But what will happen to the
Connally Bill in the House is yet to be seen.54
JAms GAY.
r After this paper was written the House of Representatives approved
a substitute for ,the Connally Plant Seizure bill, and the substitute was
sent to the Senate. Adopted by a vote of 231 to 141, it contained most of
the features of the Connally bill but added a number of clauses aimed
generally at regulations of unions. 12 LRR 524.
Among the chief points in the measure as adopted by the House in
addition to those previously enumerated were the forbidding of strikes
in war plants except on 30 days' notice and a favorable secret ballot, and
labor unions were to be required to register with the Labor Relations
Board and to file financial data. They are also forbidden to make politi-
cal contributions. See, Compromise in the Anti-Strike Measure, 12 LRR
554.
The Senate-House conferees eliminated from the bill the provisions
requiring unions to register and file financial data with the Labor Rela-
tions Board. Eliminated also was the clause which would have made
decisions of the War Labor Board subject to court review.
Of special importance to those -concerned with labor relations is the
provision of the bill which requires WLB decisions to conform to the
Wagner Act. Already recognized widely as a possible "sleeper," it is
doubtful if the full potentialities of this provision have yet been appre-
ciated. See LRR Analysis, June 14, 1943.
For a statement of the protests of labor against the bill and for the
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